On 2 August 1990, Iraqi military forces attacked Kuwait and quickly took control of that small state on the Persian Gulf. As justification for the invasion, Saddam Hussein claimed that Kuwait was historically a province of Iraq, a dubious assertion at best.
In a matter of days, Iraqi forces not only seized Kuwait but took position on the Saudi-Kuwaiti border, posing a clear threat to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and eventually did briefly invade Saudi Arabia. The Saudi king requested international support on 6 August and a global coalition led by the United States immediately answered the call.
With Iraqi forces reeling from the air campaign, the ground offensive began on 24 February 1991 and in less than 100 hours, dislodged Iraqi forces from Kuwait and compelled Saddam Hussein to capitulate.
Deception played a key role in the way this plan developed. Given the size, capability, and deployment of the Iraqi Army, deceiving the Iraqi chain of command at both the operational and tactical levels became critical to Coalition commanders. This talk will examine the development and implementation of the Coalition deception plan, including the plan’s objectives, the ways and means used to achieve these goals, and the degree to which the plan succeeded in misleading Iraqi commanders.